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·1· 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In 1960, the automobile industry in Mexico consisted of a dozen small 
firms that assembled vehicles from imported kits. By 1970, there was 
substantial automobile manufacture in Mexico: 60 percent of each 
vehicle sold in Mexico was produced there. By 1980, Mexico had be-
come a significant exporter of automotive parts, particularly to the 
United States. Cars "made in the U.S." had a fair chance of containing 
Mexican-built engines, springs, windshields, or transmissions, and au-
tomotive exports had become a point of friction between the U.S. and 
Mexican governments. Moreover, during these years, the automobile 
industry was the engine for a new surge of industrial growth in the 
Mexican economy. This book explores this transformation at three 
levels: 
First, it aims to provide a historical account of the growth of auto-
mobile manufacturing in Mexico, a significant element in the indus-
trialization of the country and an important chapter in the history of 
the internationalization of the automobile industry. 
Second, it aims to understand bargaining and dependency relations 
between transnational corporations (TNCS) and the state in developing 
countries. The coming of automobile manufacture to Mexico has been 
accompanied by a steadily increasing domination by transnational 
firms—Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Volkswagen, Nissan, Renault, 
and American Motors. Nevertheless, the development of automobile 
manufacture would not have occurred without the continuous exer-
tions of the Mexican state. The twenty-year history of the automobile 
industry in Mexico thus provides an unusually rich case for examining 
bargaining between states and TNCS in the overall context of the de-
pendency of a developing country. 
Third, most generally and for us most importantly, it seeks to ex-
emplify a historical-structural method, demonstrating the ability of this 
approach to address the fundamental issues of social-science inquiry. 
The approach, simply stated, follows Marx's maxim: "Men make their 
own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circum-
stances directly found, given and transmitted from the past."1 
1 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Robert C. Tucker, 
ed., The Marx-Engeb Reader (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 437. 
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INTRODUCTION 
However much this may seem like common sense, it is decidedly not 
the established position in the social sciences, particularly in the United 
States. All too often, theorists a priori assume either that there are 
certain historical laws or social structures that determine and thus 
explain human action, or that individuals or groups exercising their 
free will can voluntaristically re-create themselves or society. Our in-
tention is to use a historical-structural method that is neither deter-
ministic nor voluntaristic. We will explore what possibilities for human 
action are open or closed at a particular time within given social struc-
tures; we will try to explain the interests of actors and their power to 
create change within these historical limits; and we will look at how 
actions taken over time (i.e., human history) change or maintain social 
structures, which themselves open possibilities for, as well as limit, 
future action. 
The structures with which we are most concerned are those of cap-
italism as a world system. These are the structures that define de-
pendency in less-developed countries (LDCS). Proceeding from our his-
torical-structural approach, we see these as constricting but not 
determining the chances for development. There are possibilities for 
action—in this case, by the state—to make development happen. But 
whether this development can be rapid and whether its fruits can be 
equitably shared are among the questions for our analysis. 
BARGAINING AND DEPENDENCY 
Three episodes of bargaining between the Mexican state and the trans-
national automobile firms were particularly important in moving the 
automobile industry in Mexico from simple assembly to domestic man-
ufacture to exports. These three bargaining conflicts and the changes 
they brought about are the substance of our narrative. The central 
actors were the Mexican government and the transnational automobile 
firms, but Mexican entrepreneurs and the home-country governments 
of the TNCs played important supporting roles. Though vital to the 
development of the industry, labor in Mexico was never involved in 
shaping industrial policy toward the automobile sector. Bargaining 
among the key actors moved the industry forward from assembly to 
domestic manufacture to exports, but this bargaining took place within 
structures that were both national and international. The political econ-
omy of Mexico has been continually shaped by its dependent relation-
ships with the world capitalist system, and the Mexican automobile 
industry by its dependent relationships with the world auto industry. 
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These complex structures delimited the alternatives and shaped the 
interests of the actors and their power to choose among them. 
Our analysis proceeds, though not uncritically, within the broad 
perspective of dependency theory. The theory of modernization of 
the 1950s and 1960s sought to explain underdevelopment by viewing 
some countries as simply starting later and proceeding more slowly 
than others along the path to development because of an adherence 
to traditional values and institutions.2 In this perspective, all countries 
follow essentially the same route to "modernity." By contrast, the de-
pendency perspective argues that the earlier development of some 
countries significantly alters the terms and chances of development of 
others. "Underdevelopment" in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (the 
"periphery") is not an inherent condition but rather a consequence of 
the earlier "development" of Europe and North America (the "center") 
and of the integration of the peripheral countries into a capitalist world 
economy on terms which are generally disadvantageous to them. In 
this perspective, Mexico is not simply "behind," nor can it simply follow 
in the footsteps of the United States. Rather, relationships with the 
industrialized countries hinder the development of those following 
after them. The complex and often subtle ways that such relationships 
impede development have been the primary concern of the dependencia 
perspective. 
Central to this perspective is capitalism viewed as a world system. 
The intellectual origins of the dependencia framework were rooted in 
the concern of Latin American scholars for the domestic consequences 
of imperialism. The world capitalist system, the dependency approach 
argues, is "characterized by a functional division of labor" between the 
center and the periphery. 
Countries of the center are industrially advanced and viewed as 
capable of developing dynamically in accordance with their inter-
nal needs; they are the main beneficiaries of global links. The 
periphery has a less autonomous type of development, conditioned 
2 For explications of the modernization approach, see Gabriel A. Almond and James 
S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
I960); Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modern-
ization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). Important critiques of the modernization 
theory include Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 9 (1967):292-346; Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Mo-
dernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," American Journal of Sociology 
72 (1967):351-362; and Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America in the Third World (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
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by the requirements of the center's expansion. Dependency anal-
ysis attempts to understand, and evaluate, the developmental im-
plications of peripheral capitalism.3 
Simply stated, dependency is a situation "in which the rate and di-
rection of accumulation are externally conditioned."4 Dependency is 
not inconsistent with development: there may be significant economic 
growth, as there has been in Mexico over the past half-century. It is 
rather that actors and processes outside the country undergoing de-
velopment are principally responsible for setting the opportunities for 
and the limits to development. Nor does external conditioning mean 
that the benefits of development accrue only to those outside the coun-
try. The dependency perspective is concerned with the internal anal-
ogies of external structures and processes. Relationships of depend-
ency serve to benefit a domestic elite that draws wealth and power from 
its privileged position within the linkages that tie a developing country 
to the world capitalist system. 
This external conditioning is largely defined by a complex web of 
international relationships between center and periphery, involving 
trade, finance, and investment, which have varied in their relative 
3 Gary Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 7-8. 
4 Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, Slate, and Local Capital 
in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 27. Compare the more elaborate 
definition of Theotonio dos Santos: "By dependence we mean a situation in which the 
economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another 
economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two 
or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence 
when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining while other 
countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which 
can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development." Theotonio 
dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review 60 (1970):236. 
Other important treatments of dependencia are: Celso Furtado, Economic Development of 
Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970); Heho Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: A Theoretical 
Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Frank 
Bonilla and Robert Girlin, eds., Structures of Dependency (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1973), Suzanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin 
American Underdevelopment," in K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., Readings in 
U.S. Imperialism (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), pp. 155-181; Andre Gunder Frank, Cap-
italism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); James T. Petras, Latin America: From Dependence to 
Revolution (New York: John Wiley, 1973); Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and 'Depen-
dencia'," Foreign Affairs 50 (1972):517-531; and Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo 
Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1979). 
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importance but which have tended to reinforce one another. Since 
World War II, investments by transnational corporations have been 
particularly critical in shaping situations of dependency. Whereas di-
rect foreign investment was once confined primarily to mining and 
agriculture, and to activities closely connected with these, such as rail-
roads, direct foreign investment in manufacturing has been dominant 
in recent decades. These investments were triggered in part by import 
substitution policies of LDCS that were seeking to induce domestic man-
ufacturing and thus to lessen trade dependency (the export of primary 
products to pay for imports of manufactured goods), but they stemmed 
as well from the postwar international expansion of transnational cor-
porations based in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. 
While the modernization approach has tended to see TNCS as be-
neficent agents of change bringing capital, technology, and manage-
ment skills to LDCS, the dependency approach has inclined toward a 
more critical view, arguing that investments by TNCS have posed a threat 
to domestic capital accumulation and that manufacturing industries in 
LDCS have been shaped more in response to world market conditions 
and the global strategies of TNCS than in response to the needs of the 
populations of developing countries. One important concern of the 
dependency approach with transnational corporations has to do with 
their consequences for distribution, TNCS, it is argued, not only impede 
national accumulation, but they also foster an inequitable international 
distribution of income by shifting capital from developing to developed 
countries (through profit repatriation, payments for technology, and 
sales of parts and equipment). Further, it is argued that TNCS reinforce 
an inequitable distribution of income within developing countries. Im-
portant as this concern is, it is not the one on which we will primarily 
focus. Our main interest, rather, lies in the possible distortions of an 
LDC'S economy, society, and politics that can follow from the activities 
of TNCS. Transnational corporations, it has been argued, are unwilling 
to invest in activities that would promote growth and industrialization. 
They utilize inappropriate (capital-intensive) technology and introduce 
inappropriate products into LDCS. Further, they prevent the devel-
opment of an indigenous economic base, squeezing out local entre-
preneurs or pre-empting their entry into the most dynamic sectors of 
the economy; and they distort local market structures, visiting upon 
LDCS the oligopolistic structures and practices of globally organized 
industries. Finally, it is claimed, TNCS co-opt local elites or form alliances 
with domestic ent repreneurs to block government efforts at regulation, 
and they use their influence with home-country governments to keep 
host-country governments in line. 
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These hypothesized distortions will be foremost in our attention as 
we examine the consequences of TNC activities during two decades of 
development of the automobile industry in Mexico. The nature of these 
consequences has depended not only on the actions of the transnational 
automobile corporations, however, but also on the actions of the Mex-
ican state. There has been a decided tendency in dependencia analyses 
to depict the state as passive and powerless in the face of the TNCS, not 
as an actor able or inclined to oppose them in any significant respect. 
In this work, we proceed from a different assumption: that in certain 
circumstances, the state in developing countries can and will attempt 
to alter the behavior of TNCS and the consequences of that behavior. 
It may even seek to alter some of the structural aspects of dependency 
in which TNCS have a substantial stake. Exploring this assumption re-
quires attention to bargaining between the state and TNCS. 
This study seeks to advance the understanding of dependency and 
development processes in a number of different ways: 
(1) It focuses on a single industry over two decades of growth and 
change. Dependency studies that take entire countries as their focus 
of analysis tend to sketch the mechanisms of dependency only in very 
broad strokes. Studies of single industries can provide a much clearer 
understanding of the predicaments faced by specific actors and what 
they can and cannot do in them. On the other hand, studies of single 
industries within the dependency perspective have largely been re-
stricted to the extractive industries. We focus on a manufacturing in-
dustry because this has been the most dynamic sector of foreign in-
vestment in recent decades and because the lack of industrialization 
was a defining feature of dependency before World War II that many 
third-world governments have sought to overcome. Furthermore, the 
particular industry examined, automobile manufacture, is one that has 
gone through significant changes in its global organization, thus allow-
ing us to follow the consequences of changes in international structure 
for actors in Mexico. 
(2) It pays particular attention to public policy toward the industry. 
Many dependency studies concentrate so much on the structural con-
straints that define situations of dependency, or presume the state to 
be so passive, that they fail to make a serious inquiry into public policy. 
The automobile industry in Mexico has been an object of government 
policy for the past quarter-century. We want to analyze not only the 
constraints imposed by situations of dependency but also the alter-
natives for action within these constraints and the consequences of 
choices made. At least in the Mexican case, this requires an examination 
of the making and implementing of public policy. 
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(3) For related reasons, this study pays particular attention to bar-
gaining between the Mexican state and the transnational automobile 
firms. The Mexican state has by no means been able to establish by 
fiat whatever policy it chooses. Instead, it has had to negotiate with the 
transnational automobile firms. Although there have been a number 
of excellent studies of bargaining between third-world governments 
and transnational firms, these have not been fully integrated into the 
dependency perspective. 
(4) It is a case study of the limits of possibility for a state seeking to 
overcome dependency while abiding by the norms of global capitalism. 
The Mexican government has not attempted to remove Mexico from 
the world capitalist system. Rather, it has pursued policies aimed at 
providing both growth and increased autonomy for Mexico within that 
system, and nowhere has this been more evident than in the automobile 
industry. Our study therefore is a kind of test case for the dependency 
perspective. 
(5) It employs a historical-structural approach that gives equal emphasis 
to structures and actions, to limits and possibilities. A historical-struc-
tural approach is already embodied in the best examples of the de-
pendency perspective; what we seek now to contribute is a deliberate 
and consistent application of this approach to both of our principal 
actors, the Mexican state and the transnational automobile corpora-
tions. 
T H E HISTORICAL-STRUCTURAL APPROACH 
Taken together, dependency and bargaining manifest the central 
methodological perspective of this book—the historical-structural ap-
proach. The dominant approaches in American social science have 
tended toward either determination or voluntarism and have thus led 
to fundamental distortions of the human condition and subtle betrayals 
of the proper aims of social analysis. In contrast, the historical-struc-
tural approach holds that human beings are social products, but that 
society itself is a product of human actions. In the words of Cardoso 
and Faletto, this approach "emphasizes not just the structural condi-
tioning of social life, but also the historical transformation of structures 
by conflict, social movements and class struggles."5 
The dependency perspective places particular emphasis on struc-
tures—-particularly the structures of the world capitalist system—that 
"condition" development. These structures, to quote Cardoso and Fa-
5 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, p. x. 
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letto again, "impose limits on social processes and reiterate established 
forms of behavior."6 In the hands of some dependency analysts, this 
structural conditioning tends toward a certain determinism; possibil-
ities for significant choice within these structures and for action to 
transform structures are denied. We are interested, however, in the 
possibilities for change within and against existing structures. Struc-
tures condition but do not fully determine; they impose limits but also 
shape possibilities. The task for social analysis is to explore, concretely, 
the structural limits and the possibilities for action in particular his-
torical situations. Our emphases on state policy and on bargaining are 
intended to make explicit these concerns with alternative possibilities 
and with the transformation of structures. 
Structures shape the interests and power of the actors within them. 
Insofar as structures bequeath overwhelming power to some actors or 
mold a fundamental convergence of interests among actors, structures 
will tend to persist. Efforts to alter them will be ineffectual. However, 
structures tend to "generate contradictions and social tensions"7—i.e., 
conflicts of interest—and these set the stage for change. One major 
task of this study is to explain the interests of the Mexican state and 
the transnational automobile firms, to reach some understanding of 
how and why their interests converged at some points and diverged 
into conflict at others. 
The historical-structural approach to the actors in a set of events 
proceeds from three leading ideas: (1) Each actor has interests and 
power of its own—the wherewithal to make its own history. (2) The 
possibilities for action are limited by the structures in which actors are 
enmeshed, and each actor's interests and power are shaped by its po-
sition within these structures. (3) These structures are historical prod-
ucts of past human actions and, in certain circumstances, are suscep-
tible to marginal change or transformation by the concerted efforts of 
the actors. 
For an elaboration of a historical-structural approach applied to 
transnational corporations, we turn to industrial-organization theory. 
First formulated in the United States and most widely employed in the 
study of the U.S. economy, industrial-organization theory has been 
used almost exclusively in the analysis of industries within the geo-
graphically constrained national market of a developed country. Be-
cause our concerns are with a developing country and with transna-
tional corporations, which operate simultaneously in several different 
6 Ibid., p. xi. 
7 Ibid. 
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national markets, several revisions of industrial-organization theory 
will be necessary to fit it to our purposes. 
The structure most important (though hardly the only one) in shap-
ing the interests and power of the transnational automobile firms in 
the Mexican setting is the structure of the industry in which they 
compete, both globally and in Mexico. Two aspects of this structure 
will be salient in our analysis: (a) the structure of the market, principally 
the number of firms in the industry, and (b) the structure of ownership, 
principally the extent of domination by transnational firms. These 
aspects of the Mexican automobile industry structure were in part the 
result of struggle between the state and the TNCS. Once created, they 
have been crucial in shaping the behavior of the firms and the per-
formance of the industry in Mexico. 
Unlike the case for the transnational firms, there is no single struc-
ture which is of pre-eminent importance in shaping the interests and 
power of the state or in delimiting its possibilities for action. The 
relevant structures are many: they are domestic and international, and 
they are political, economic, social, military, and cultural. Moreover, 
despite the renaissance of attention to "the state," there is no single 
theory of the state to which we can turn for an elaboration of the 
historical-structural approach; we have had to fashion our own, draw-
ing on a number of perspectives. 
Consistent with the historical-structural approach, we depict the state 
as an actor with interests and power of its own—a conception that is 
denied, explicitly or implicitly, by a number of current perspectives. 
This hardly means the state can act "just as it pleases," nor is it an 
insistence on the autonomy of the state. While state action may be 
shaped and constrained, for example, by its relationship to the do-
mestic class structure or to the structure of international finance, the 
state is nevertheless an actor, capable of formulating its own policies 
and of exerting power in an effort to carry them through. 
Our approach to the state understands its interests as being "embed-
ded orientations" that have been acquired and institutionalized in the 
course of its history as the state has responded to problems and op-
portunities facing it. The power of the state is set both by internal 
characteristics (unity, technical capability) and by its relationship to the 
structures around it, particularly the domestic class structure. In the 
Mexican situation, it is particularly important to see the active role of 
the state in shaping this relationship to domestic classes; it has not 
merely been an object that was captured or shaped in the conflict 
among them. 
The historical-structural approach—this concern with structure and 
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action, with dependency and bargaining—informs the organization of 
this book. Chapters 2 through 4 introduce the major actors and the 
structures within which they are enmeshed, and it sets forth in greater 
detail the theoretical perspectives that guide our analysis. Chapter 2 
provides an overview of the political economy of Mexico, focusing on 
the changing character of dependency within the world capitalist sys-
tem, and lays out our theoretical approach to the Mexican state as an 
actor. Chapter 3 does the same for the world automobile industry, 
showing Mexico's place within that structure in 1960 and setting forth 
our theoretical approach to the transnational automobile corporations. 
Chapter 4 elaborates our framework for the analysis of bargaining 
between the state and transnational corporations. 
Drawing on this foundation, chapters 5 through 10 analyze de-
pendency and bargaining in the automobile industry in Mexico be-
tween 1960 and 1980, concentrating on three major episodes. For each, 
we will (a) examine the structures that determined the limits and pos-
sibilities for action and shaped the interests and power of the actors, 
(b) examine the conflict itself and show how its resolution led to change 
or continuity in the structure of the automobile industry in Mexico, 
and (c) show how this new structure set the stage for the next conflict, 
imposing new limitations but opening other possibilities for action. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the 1962 bargaining: the effort 
of the Mexican state to create a manufacturing industry in Mexico by 
means of an import-substitution policy, the resulting enactment and 
implementation of a governmental decree, and the structure of own-
ership and of the market that resulted. Within these new structures, 
there arose a series of problems for the state and for some of the firms, 
particularly the Mexican-owned ones. Chapters 7 and 8 deal with a 
second major conflict in 1968-1969, growing out of these problems. 
The bargaining that took place in this connection led to a decision to 
move away from import substitution and toward export promotion as 
the basic thrust of policy. The chapters examine the difficulties this 
change engendered and the way in which the problems were rendered 
more serious by a crisis in the political economy of Mexico in the mid-
1970s, as well as a series of changes in the structure of the world 
automobile industry which had important implications for Mexico and 
the transnational corporations. Chapter 9 considers a third bargaining 
episode, in 1977, the result of which was a new decree strengthening 
export requirements, and chapter 10 treats a variety of problems that 
resulted from this Decree. 
Chapter 11 draws a number of conclusions about the historical-
12 
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structural approach, the consequences of TNCS for developing coun-
tries, and the possibilities for altering these consequences by state ac-
tion. In a postscript, we provide a brief discussion of a new automotive 
policy, promulgated in September 1983, while Mexico was in the midst 
of an economic crisis. 
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